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not supported by the evidence and that the Court erred 
in its interpretation and application of the law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs listed for sale 2 pieces of property with 
the Inland Realtors, Inc. early in 1949. The 2 pieces of 
property adjoin each other north and south and measure 
55 feet in width and 165 feet deep. For many years the 
property was divided into 2 tracts and were owned by the 
same person. On the north tract a duplex known as 372 
and 374 D Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was built many 
years ago and later a 2-storied brick house facing 7th Ave-
nue, was built on the south tract and is known as 371 7th 
Avenue. 
About the 6th day of April, 1935, Mrs. Anna J. 
Peterson, mother of the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, 
and her husband purchased the south tract from a man by 
the name of Bennett on which the 2-storied brick house 
stood, the abstract which was introduced in evidence 
showed that the dimensions of the property were 55 feet 
frontage on 7th Avenue and 110 feet deep. In 1938, 3 
years later, Mrs. Anna J. Peterson and her husband pur-
chased the north tract on which stood the duplex, from 
Bennett, the abstract showing the dimensions of this tract 
to be 55 feet wide and 64 feet deep. The elder Petersons 
purchased the property for income purposes. They re-
modelled the duplex into a triplex and they lived in the 
2-storied brick house as their home but rented part of the 
property. After Mr. Peterson passed away, Mrs. Anna J. 
Peterson sold the entire tract of property in 1944 to her 
son, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, one of the plaintiffs in this 
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action, on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. He took over 
possession and also took charge of the rentals of the apart-
ments and his mother made her home with him and his 
family. 
On February 2 3, 1949 both places were listed for sale 
separately and advertisements were run in the newspapers. 
The 2 addresses were listed but no description of the 
property by meets and bounds were given. The defendant 
saw the advertisements of 1 of the realtors and made an 
appointment to see the triplex. 
At the time the defendant inspected the property 
nothing was said about the south boundary line or what 
the dimensions of the lot were. There was a chicken wire 
fence supported by small steel posts about 1 foot south of 
a cement walk that went around the south side of the tri-
plex to the back door. It was covered with vines of last 
summer's vintage. 
The defendant decided to purchase the triplex and 
signed an earnest money receipt on the 5th day of March, 
1949 and deposited with the real estate company the down 
payment of $3,000.00. There was no description of the 
property in the earnest money receipt. On March 10, 
1949 the defendant had the title examined, having been 
furnished with an abstract by the plaintiffs, and that was 
the first time defendant had been advised of the descrip-
tion of the property showing that the tract was 55 feet 
wide by 64 feet deep. About March 15, 1949 the contract 
in question was executed describing the property as it ap-
peared in the abstract. The defendant took possession of 
the property on April 18, 1949 and moved into the place. 
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There are several sharp conflicts in the testimony 
given by the respective parties in regard to the south line 
of the property. The defendant says the plaintiff told her 
that the fence marked the south 64-foot line of her proper-
ty. The. plaintiff says he does not remember that he ever 
told her that the fence was the south boundary of her 
property. 
The defendant testified that in.the latter part of May 
or June, 1949, when the Petersons came back from southern 
Utah, that she asked the plaintiff if the fence line was the 
south 64-foot line of her property and Peterson said, ((Yes." 
She then said she asked him if he would sell her from 3 to 
6 feet south of the fence, which he refused to do. Peterson 
admitted such a conversation took place at about that time. 
When the defendant decided that she would sell this 
property or refinance it the defendant testified that she 
was informed by prospective purchasers that she did not 
have 64 feet of ground within the south fence line. At 
that time she decided to have a survey made. The day the 
stakes were set she advised Peterson that her south boundary 
line was 11 feet 9 inches south of the fence. When he com-
plained about selling his back yard the defendant offered 
to sell part of it, but not all of it, back to him but no agree-
ment was reached. However, Peterson removed the fence 
when she requested him to do so. In March of 1951 action 
was brought by plaintiffs to reform the contract on the 
grounds of mutual mistake. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The appellant relies upon the following errors for a 
reversal of the judgment in this case: 
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POINT ONE 
That the Court erred in making Finding No.4 to the 
effect that the plaintiffs early in 1949 offered said triplex 
for sale and represented to the real estate company with 
which the property was listed that the said triplex property 
was north of said fence for the reason that there is not one 
scintilla of evidence in the record to substantiate said 
finding. 
POINT TWO 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 5 to the 
effect that the plaintiffs believed that the fence line be-
tween the house and triplex corresponded with the dividing 
line between said properties as set forth in the legal descrip-
tions of the properties in the abstract of title and other 
instruments pertaining to said properties; that plaintiffs 
relied on this belief in executing the real estate contract 
with the defendant. 
POINT THREE 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 6 that 
the plaintiffs executed the real estate contract which is 
the subject of this action, intending to sell to the defendant 
the triplex with only that property north of the fence, for 
the reason that said finding is not supported by the evi-
dence to the degree required by the rule in cases of mutual 
mistake. 
POINT FOUR 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 7 that 
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when the defendant purchased the triplex and executed 
the earnest money agreement and real estate contract she 
understood that she was purchasing only the property north 
of the fence, for the reason that said finding is not sup-
ported by the evidence to the degree required by the rule 
-in cases of mutual mistake. 
POINT FIVE 
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law 
No. 1 that there was a mutual mistake of fact on the part 
of the plaintiffs and defendant with respect to the property 
described in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
them; that both parties intended that the said contract 
describe the property north of the fence separa~ing the 
triplex from the house on the north, for the reason that 
the Court erred in its interpretation and application of the 
law as to mutual mistakes. 
POINT SIX 
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of Law 
No. 2 that, if the plaintiffs were in any way negligent in 
the execution of the real estate contra~ct such negligence 
is excusable, for the reason that the Court misinterpreted 
the evidence and the law as to its application in cases of 
mutual mistake. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 4 
to the effect that the plaintiffs early in 1949 offered 
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said triplex for sale and represented to the real estate 
company with which the property was listed that the 
said triplex property was north of said fence for the 
reason that there is not one scintilla of evidence in the 
record to substantiate said finding. 
From the testimony of Mrs. Peterson, one of the plain-
tiffs, in regard to the listing of the property with the real 
estate company (7 -52) (7 -53), it appears that she did not 
make any statement in regard to the fence line. Jn fact, 
she testified that she did not know the dimensions of the 
property, that she only made a guess at it, that the real 
estate agent asked her questions which she answered as best 
she could and further testified that she did not know the 
dimensions of the entire tract of land, including the 2 pieces 
of property which were listed for sale. 
-The most probative evidence of the representations 
made to the Inland Realtors, Inc., appears in the listing 
(plaintiffs' Exhibit ((A"), by Mrs. J. LeRoy Peterson, 1 
of the plaintiffs in this action. The size of the lot is repre-
sented as 50x60, which undoubtedly referred to the width 
and depth and would place the south boundary line at at 
least 8 feet south of the fence. The evidence is positive that 
the chicken wire fence was never mentiond as the south 
boundary line of the triplex. The defendant says that it was 
never mentioned to her until long after she had occupied 
the property and Peterson testified that he did not recall 
ever mentioning to the defendant that the chicken wire 
fence was the south boundary of the triplex property. In 
paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' complaint, they set out the de-
scription of the property as it appeared in the written con-
tract for the purchase of the both pieces of property giving 
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the dimensions of each tract and signed and exe-cuted by 
them as well as the mother. 
To say that these plaintiffs, after being fully conversant 
with the transactions by which the elder Petersons obtained 
the property from the Bennetts and the subsequent pur-
chase by the plaintiffs of the property from the mother, 
did not know the dimensions of the tract were 55 feet by 
16 5 feet, is unbelievable. 
Point Two 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 5 
to the effect that the plaintiffs believed that the fence 
line between the house and triplex corresponded with 
the dividing line between said properties as set forth in 
the legal descriptions of the properties in the abstract 
of title and other instruments pertaining to said proper-
ties; that plaintiffs relied on this belief in executing the 
real estate contract with the defendant. 
Under this assignment we desire to call the Court's 
attention to the evidence of the record as to the fence line 
being the dividing line between the said properties as set 
forth in the legal descriptions of the properties in the ab-
stract of title and other instruments. 
The only evidence that I can find in the record to 
support the intention of the parties, is the bald statement 
and self-serving declaration that plaintiff Peterson said he 
intended to sell only that part of the property lying north 
of the fence (T -46) and that Mrs. Peterson made the 
same statement (T-47) and there is not one word of evi-
dence that either of them ever advised Mrs. Eldredge of 
their intention. 
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There is no evidence in the record as to any con-
versation had between the grantors and the grantee at or 
prior to the execution and delivery of the contract with 
regard to the boundary line or with respect to the land 
which the grantors intended to convey or the grantee in-
tended to acquire. There is no evidence that defendant was 
buying the land as bounded by the fence. There was no 
evidence that the Petersons told her they were selling the 
land as bounded by the fence. The most that can be said 
of the evidence is that it shows the fence was not on the 64-
foot boundary line set forth in the contract and as to 
whether or not there was a mutual mistake between the 
parties in writing or causing to be written in the contract 
an erroneous description of the property actually intended 
to be conveyed, the record is silent. 
As a matter of fact, the record shows that, when the 
defendant first inspected the triplex with Clinton Madsen, 
a real estate agent connected with the Home and Garden 
Company, nothing was said in regard to the size of the lot. 
When the defendant decided to purchase the property she 
was presented with an earnest money receipt on the 5th 
day of March, 1949 and deposited with the real estate 
company the down payment of $3,000.00. There was no 
description of the property in the earnest money receipt. 
On March 10, 1949 the defendant had the title examined, 
having been furnished with an abstract by the plaintiffs, 
and that was the first time the defendant had been advised 
of the description of the property showing that the tra~t 
was 55 feet wide and 64 feet deep. The attorney's opinion 
called attention to the fa.ct that the property was in the 
name of Joseph U. Peterson and Mrs. Anna J. Peterson, the 
father and mother of Joseph LeRoy Peterson, the plaintiff 
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in this action. Mrs. Eldredge called the plaintiff, Joseph 
LeRoy Peterson, and asked him why the property was not 
in his name that he was selling to her. Peterson said that 
he was buying the property from his mother and that he had 
not had time to file the necessary papers showing the ter-
mination of the joint tenancy in his father, who had passed 
away, and obtain a deed from his mother. He promised at 
that time to have the proper instruments filed at the county 
recorder's office. The property of this date still stands in 
the father's and mother's name. About March 15, 1949 
the contract in question was executed between the parties, 
describing the property as it appeared in the abstract~ The 
defendant took possession of the property on April 18, 
1949 and moved into the place. 
In the case of Udelavitz vs. Ketchen, 190 Pacific 
1029, the Court discusses the weight and sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain a reformation of a contract on the 
grounds of mutual mistake: t:c:Before relief can be granted 
either in an original action therefor or when relied upon 
as an equitable defense, it must appear that the mistake 
was mutual." and cites the following authorities: 
Hoback vs. Kilgores, 21 Atlantic Reports 317 
Houser vs. Austin, 1 0 Pacific 3 7. 
Continuing its discussion, the Court says, uThe evi-
dence must be clear and satisfactory leaving but little if 
any doubt of the mistake. It must be made out by the 
clearest and most satisfactory testimony such as to leave 
no fair and reasonable doubt on the mind that the writing 
does not correctly embody the real intention of the parties. 
A mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice and 
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the burden of proof is upon the party alleging the mutual 
mistake" and then cites the following authorities: 
French vs. Chapman, 13 Southeast 479 
Farmville Insurance Company vs. Butler, 55 Md. 
233. 
The question of the degree of proof required to en-
title a party to a reformation of a written instrument has 
been before this Court in a number of cases. The Court 
has also spoken on the weight and sufficiency of the evi-
dence to justify a reformation of a written contract. In 
the case of George vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, 
69 Utah 460; 256 Pacific 400, the Court says: uThe law 
is well settled that in this and other jurisdictions that a 
written contract will be reformed to express the agree-
ment of the parties where the proof of the mistake is clear, 
definite and convincing and where the party seeking the_ 
reformation is not guilty of negligence in drawing the 
contract nor of latches in making timely application for 
the reformation." 
In Nordfors vs. Knight, 90 Utah 114; 60 Pacific 2nd 
111 5, the Court says: uA written contract will be reformed 
to express the agreement of the parties where proof of 
mistake is clear, definite and convincing and where the 
party seeking relief is not guilty of negligence in the exe-
cution of the contract or of latches in making timely ap-
plication for the reformation." 
To the same effect in the case of Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company vs. McClelland, 63 Pacific 2nd 657, 
the Court states that the evidence of the mutual mistake 
must be clear and satisfactory to justify reformation of a 
written instrument and the mere preponderance of the 
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evidence is insufficient but such mistake need not be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Other Utah cases in which the weight and sufficiency 
of the evidence has been discussed are as follows: 
Ewing vs. Keith, 16 Utah 312; 52 Pacific 4 
Deseret National Bank vs. Dinwoodey, 17 Utah 43; 
53 Pacific 21 5 
Weight vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584; 147 Pacific 899 
Cram vs. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384; 186 Pacific 100 
Wherritt vs. Dunn, 48 Utah 309; 159 Pacific 534. 
Point Three 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 6 
that the plaintiffs executed the real estate contract which 
is the subject of tl1is action, intending to sell to the de-
fendant the triplex with only that property north of the 
fence for the reason that the said finding is not support-
ed by the evidence to the degree required by the rule 
in cases of mutual mistake. 
The same rule applies to this assignment of error as 
set forth in the argume.nt of Point Two. The only evi-
dence of the intention of the Petersons that appears in the 
record, is the statement by Peterson (T -46) that he only 
intended to convey to the defendant the property north 
of the chicken wire fence and Mrs. Peterson made the same 
statement (T -47) but neither ever conveyed that inten-
tion to the defendant at any time prior to the execution 
and the delivery of the contract. 
It is the contention of the defendant that this evidence 
is neither satisfa~ctory, clear or convincing that such was 
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the intention of the parties and it is the general rule that 
equity will not furnish relief where the mistake arose con-
cerning facts in reference to which the party claiming this 
mistake had means of knowledge and may have ascertained 
the truth in regard to the mistake in the contract. 
In ·the case of Monterey Park Bank vs. West Holly-
wood Bank, 13 Pacific 2nd 976, the Court held that a party 
cannot rely on his own negligence in failing to discover 
error in the amount of property conveyed. 
Point Four 
That the Court erred in making Finding No. 7 
that when the defendant purchased the triplex and exe-
cuted the earnest money agreement and real estate con-
tract she understood that she was purchasing only the 
property north of the fence for the reason that said 
finding is not supported by the evidence to the degree 
required by the rule in cases of mutual mistake. 
In regard to this assignment we submit that there 
is no evidence that the defendant was ever told that the 
chicken wire fence was the southern boundary of the prop-
erty that she was to purchase. The transaction took place 
in the latter part of February and the first of March in 
the middle of the wintertime; the chicken wire fence was 
covered with morning glory vines of the past summer; 
there was nothing in the earnest money receipt which gave 
any description of the property except the address and the 
first time that the defendant was informed of the dimen-
sions of the property in connection with this transaction 
was when she received a 'Yritten opinion from her attorney, 
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in which, among other things, she was advised that the 
legal title to the property was not in the name of Joseph 
LeRoy Peterson and his wife, plaintiffs in this a.ction, but 
in the name of his father and mother. The defendant had 
a conversation with the plaintiff, Joseph LeRoy Peterson, 
asking him why the property that he was selling her was 
not in his name. It is uncontradicted that he explained to 
her that he was purchasing the property from his mother, 
that he had not had time to file the necessary papers show-
ing the conveyance to him and the termination of the joint 
tenancy of his father who had passed away, but that he 
would have it taken care of immediately. This statement 
was made before the contract was ever executed by Peter-
son and his wife and the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge. The 
attorney's opinion showed that the property was 55 feet 
wide by 64 feet in depth and that was the amount of 
property that she understood she would purchase and no 
one had ever informed her to the contrary during the 
negotiations or prior to the execution of the contract. 
It is interesting to note the testimony of Mr. Peter-
son ( T-3 9) on cross examination: 
· Q. ((Did you ever tell Mrs. Eldredge that that 
fence was the sop.th line of the 64 foot line?" 
A. ((I can't say that I did, sir." 
Q. ((So you don't know then what she be-
lieved or thought or understood then about that 
fence, do you, if you did not tell her that was the 
line?" 
A. ul don't know what she understood, sir." 
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Q. ety ou say you never told her that that was 
the south line of that 64 foot lot?" 
A. ul don't believe I did, sir." 
The defendant, Mrs. Eldredge, testified that she was 
never informed that the chicken wire fence was the south 
boundary of her property until May or June of 1949 after 
the Petersons came back from southern Utah. At that time 
she said she asked Peterson if that was the south line of the 
64 foot lot and he said, uYes," and that she wanted to know 
if he would sell her from 3 to 6 feet on the south of the 
fence in order to be able to have some space to. the south 
of her house. Peterson refused to do so. It is apparent that 
there was no participation in a mutual mistake on the part 
of the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge. The Petersons owned 
both pieces of property at the time that Mrs. Eldredge 
purchased the north tract and certainly the fact that there 
was a chicken wire fence 4 feet high covered with vines and 
flowers would give any indication that it was a permanent 
boundary line between these 2 tracts of property owned by 
the same person. 
Point Five 
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of 
Law No. 1 that there was a mutual mistake of fact on 
the part of the plaintiffs and defendant with respect to 
the property described in the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract between them; that both parties intended that said 
contract describe the property north of the fence sepa-
rating the triplex from the house on the north for the 
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reason that the Court erred in its interpretation of the 
applicaion of the law as to mutual mistakes. 
This conclusion is based upon the evidence set out in 
Finding No. 5 and Finding No. 6 and it is our contention 
that it is based upon a misinterpretation and application 
of the law as to mutual mistake as hereinbefore set forth. 
Point Six 
That the Court erred in making Conclusion of 
Law No. 2 that if plaintiffs were in any way negligent 
in the execution of the real estate contract such negli-
gence is excusable for the reason that the Court mis-
interpreted th.e evidence and the law as to its application 
in cases of mutual mistake. 
Under this assignment of error it is apparent that the 
Court did not take in to consideration the degree of proof 
necessary to reach such a conclusion. It is the general rule 
that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a party 
cannot rely upon his own negligence or carelessness to re-
form a written instrument. In this case there is no doubt 
of the negligence of the plaintiffs. They were familiar with 
the history of the transactions of this tract of land for 
several years. Peterson had lived with his parents in the 
home on the south tract of land before he was married and 
he lived with them from July, 1935 until 1937. In 1938, 
his parents bought the north tract but they had used the 
property up to the duplex which they did not own for a 
period of 3 years. They rehabilitated the lawn, had a garden 
and grew flowers on the very property that is now in dis-
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pute. Mrs. Anna J. Peterson, the mother of the plaintiff, 
testified that they had occupied this property that did not 
belong to them for the reason that she knew some day 
later they were going to buy it. 
In the case of Greve vs. Taft Realty Company, 281 
Pacific 645, the question arose as to whether the testimony 
of the two officers of the realty company where they had 
not read the agreement and did not intend to bind the 
corporation, can be given any legal effect in an action to 
reform a deed, the Court held that the great weight of 
authority was against any such legal premise. 
In the case of Goodrich vs. Lathrop, 29 Pacific 329, 
the Court held that under a statute of rescission of instru-
ments, it was held that rescission cannot be adjudged for a 
mere mistake unless the party against whom it is adjudged 
can be restored to substantially the same position as if the 
contract had not been made. 
The court by its decision has deprived the defendant 
of 11 feet 9 inches of property south of the fence line 
upon a theory of mutual mistake. We maintain that that 
evidence is insufficient to substantiate such a holding and· 
that there is no evidence that the defendant, Mrs. Eldredge, 
was at any time advised of the intention of the plaintiffs 
and that she relied entirely upon the description of the 
property which the plaintiffs furnished to her in an abstract 
which she had examined and understood that the dimen-
sions of the property were 55 feet in width by 64 feet in 
depth. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we submit that the evidence introduced 
in this case and under the arguments and authorities herein 
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presented, the judgment of the Lower Court should be 
vacated and set aside and that the contract for the sale 
of said property be declared in full force and effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEN E. ROBERTS 
Attorney· for the Defendant. 
91 0 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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not indicate the south limits of her property. 
While plaintiffs' evidence of the mutual mistake 
must be clear and S>atisfactory to justify reformation of 
the real estate contract, and a mere preponderance of 
the evidence is not sufficient, it must be remembered 
that the plaintiffs do not have the burden of proving 
such mistake beyond a reasonable doubt. See M etropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co. v. McClelland, 63 P. 2d 657. 
Plaintiffs submit without lengthy recitation of the 
details of the evidence and without lengthy argument, 
that the record establishes the mutual mistake by evi-
dence that is n1ost clear, definite and convincing. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT, OR, IF THEY 
WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE, THE COURT DID 
NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS EXCUSABLE. 
When the court concluded as a matter of law that 
if the plaintiffs were in any way negligent in the execu-
tion of the real estate contract, such negligence is excus-
able, the court was well aware that these plaintiffs were 
familiar with the house and triplex properties. It was 
this very familiarity with the p·roperties that caused the 
plain tiffs to act as they did. 
The plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson lived in the 
large house on the corner from 1935 to 1937 and during 
that period the plaintiff Kathryn Pedersen Peterson was 
a frequent visitor in the home. This was before the 
parents of plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson bought the 
triplex next door. During that time and until 1944 there 
was a wooden fence which partially separated the house 
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from the triplex. This fence was in line with the south 
edge of the sidewalk which runs· along the south side of 
the triplex. The back yard used with the house included 
all the ground up to this sidewalk along the south side 
of the triplex and up to the old wooden fence. In other 
words, the yard used with the house included all the 
property· now under dispute .. 
So both these plaintiffs came to know the back yard 
of the house as they used and saw it during the period 
from 1935 to 1937 and thereafter. In 1944, when plain-
tiffs put up the 4 ft. wire fence they did not arbitrarily 
place it; rather they replaced the portion of old wooden 
fence with new fence and extended the new fence across 
the yard so as to separate the house and triplex con1-
pletely. The new fence was placed along the line divid-
ing the two properties as they had always known it, in-
cluding the period from 1935 to 1937 when the elder 
Petersons owned the. large house but not the triplex. 
Never at any time prior to January, 1951, had either 
of the plaintiffs been given any indication or reason to 
believe that the house property purchased by parents of 
plaintiff Joseph LeRoy Peterson did not extend back to 
the sidewalk south of the triplex and to the old wooden 
fence. However, they did have reason to believe that 
· the house property included all that area, and that when 
the parents of Joseph LeRoy Peterson purchased the 
large house they purchased all the ground up to this 
sidewalk and wooden fence. Because of this, plaintiffs 
concluded that the fence line and legal descriptions in 
the abstracts on the house and triplex coinriderl, so far 
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as the dividing line between the two properties is con-
cerned. 
When the time came for the s·ale of the triple~, 
plaintiffs relied on this assumption and on their past 
experience and furnished the abstract on the triplex to 
the real estate company for the preparation of the uni-
form real estate contract. The contract was not made 
up by the plaintiffs but by the real estate company which 
sold the triplex to the defendant. At the· time the real 
estate contract was executed, plaintiffs were living in 
Blanding, Utah, and 'vere not in Slalt Lake City where 
they might have made a more careful check of the physi-
cal facts. Had the plaintiffs been in Salt Lake City at 
the time, they would perhaps be held to a higher degree 
of care, hut being absent they were justified in relying 
on their past experience and p·ermitting the description 
in the abstract to be used in the preparation of the con-
tract. 
Under the circumstances, plaintiffs we~re not negli-
gent but acted as reasonably prudent persons would 
have acted when they execute·d the real estate contract, 
or certainly, if they were negligent, such negligence is 
excusable. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clearly evident in this case that there was 
a mistake of fact; that it was a mutual mistake; and that 
the plaintiffs are entitled in equity to the relief they seek. 
To give to the defendant the 11 ft. 9 in. strip of ground 
in question would be to give her land she had no inten-
tion of acquiring when she purchased the triplex and 
which the plaintiffs had no intention of selling to her, 
and would do substantial hann to the plaintiffs in the 
use, enjoyment and value of their home. Therefore, the 
findings and decision of the lower court should be sus-
tained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & 
McCULLOUGH, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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